Unintended Consequences of Regulated Contract Structure by Stewart, Bryan W.




Unintended Consequences of Regulated Contract
Structure
Bryan W. Stewart
University of South Carolina
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation








Bryan W. Stewart 
 
Associate of Arts 
Dixie State College 
 
Bachelor of Art 
Utah State University 
 
Master of Accountancy 
University of Notre Dame 
 
 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in  
Business Administration 
Darla Moore School of Business 
University of South Carolina  
2013 
Accepted by:  
Scott Jackson, Chairman 
Brad Tuttle, Committee Member  
Doug Wedell, Committee Member  
Rich White, Committee Member  





















© Copyright by Bryan W. Stewart, 2013 





I thank my dissertation chair, Scott Jackson, for his insightful comments and support and 
my dissertation committee members Brad Tuttle, Doug Wedell, and Rich White for their 
considerable time and assistance.  I also thank William Snyder and Caroline Strobel for 
their invaluable help in obtaining participants for the experiment and the professionals 
who generously gave of their time to participate.  I gratefully acknowledge the comments 
and suggestions of John Barrick, Donna Bobek-Schmidt, Andy Cuccia, Dianna Falsetta, 
Marsha Keune, Al Leitch, Anne Magro, Mark Nelson, David Piercey, Tammie Schaeffer, 
Tim Rupert, Steve Smith, Brian Spilker, students in the USC tax seminar, participants at 
the 2011 Behavioral Tax Conference at George Mason University, participants at the 
2011 BYU Accounting Symposium, and workshop participants at Brigham Young 






This study examines the effect of contract structure (fixed versus contingent) and a 
contextual factor (positive versus negative benefit surprise) on tax professionals’ 
behavior.  Regulatory restrictions on contract structure are based on the belief that 
contingent fee contracts “encourage tax return preparers to take unsupported positions on 
the taxpayers’ returns” (Murphy 1989, p. 2).  Experienced tax professionals participated 
in an experiment investigating the effect of contract structure and benefit surprise on their 
judgments and decisions.  Contrary to regulators’ beliefs about the effect of contingent 
fee structures, I do not find a main effect of contract structure.  Rather, results show that 
tax professionals who contract under a fixed fee and encounter a negative benefit surprise 
are more likely to take uncertain tax positions than professionals who contract under a 
contingent fee and encounter a negative benefit surprise.  In contrast, participants who 
contract under a fixed fee and encounter a positive benefit surprise are less likely to take 
uncertain tax positions than professionals who contract under a contingent fee and 
encounter a negative benefit surprise.  Supplemental analysis shows that the form of this 
interaction changes with the aggressiveness of the position.  Results also show that tax 
professionals contracting under a contingent fee are more likely to inform their client that 
positions included on the tax return may not be supported if audited.  The overall tenure 
of the results suggests that restricting the ability of tax professionals and their clients to 
allocate risk through the use of contingent fee contracts has the unintended consequence 




to taxpayers.  These results are particularly important when considering the significant 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The effect of contract structure on the behavior of contracting parties has received 
attention from academics, policy-makers, professional organizations, and the media 
(Frankel et al. 2002; Murphy 2012).  In the academic literature, research suggests that in 
an environment where outcomes are uncertain and inputs are costly to observe, contract 
structure can play an important role in motivating behavior, aligning incentives, and 
allocating risk between contracting parties (Eisenhardt 1989).  However, contract 
structure may also result in suboptimal behavior.  For example, performance-based 
executive compensation may cause aggressive financial reporting and be a motivating 
factor in recent financial crises (Murphy 2012).  This potential for suboptimal behavior 
has prompted contract restrictions in executive compensation, investment banking, and 
auditing and tax services (Murphy 2012).  While restricting contract structure may 
influence behavior, restricting contract structure may also result in unintended 
consequences.  This study brings initial empirical evidence to bear on how contract 
structure interacts with naturally occurring contextual factors to affect tax professionals’ 
behavior.  
Consistent with concerns in other fields that compensation contracts drive 
suboptimal behavior, regulations limiting the use of contingent fees in contracts between 
tax professionals and their clients are based on claims that contingent fee contracts would 




(Murphy 1989, p. 2; Rostain 2006; Levin 2009; Department of the Treasury; “IRS;” 
2011).1  While regulators and lawmakers assert that limiting the use of contingent fee 
contracts will decrease the incidence of aggressive tax positions, the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountant’s (AICPA) Tax Practice Responsibilities Committee 
(hereafter “AICPA Committee”) emphasized the importance of contextual factors when 
considering the consequences of contingent fee structures (AICPA 2006).  They argued 
that contingent fee contract structures have been used as an important risk reduction tool 
for both taxpayers and tax professionals when the “tangible value” of the tax services to 
be offered is difficult to estimate (AICPA 2006, p. 13).   
Despite the strongly held competing views about the effect of restrictions on 
contingent fees, the sweeping restrictions on the contractual relationships between tax 
professionals and their clients (i.e., the restrictions on contingent fees discussed above) 
have been made in the absence of empirical evidence.  This observation is important 
because regulatory interference in complex economic arrangements between contracting 
parties may have unanticipated or even counterproductive consequences (Smith 1776; 
Merton, 1936; Sims and Herman 1996; Hanlon et al. 2008; Norton 2011).   
In order to understand the effect of different contract structures on tax 
professionals’ behavior, it is important to examine those structures within the context in 
which they are utilized.  Tax professionals operate in an environment where inputs are 
costly to observe and outcomes are uncertain – for example, where the extent or cost of 
tax professionals’ services are costly to observe and the benefit that the client will realize 
as a result of those services may not be precisely estimable (Kadous and Magro 2001; 
AICPA 2006).  The efficient sharing of economic risk has been identified as an important 
                                                




factor in the development of the optimal contract structure (Reese 1985; Eisenhardt 1989; 
Baiman 1990; and Phillips and Sansing 1998).  Indeed, the AICPA Committee 
emphasized the use of contingent fee contract structures as a way to allocate risk between 
taxpayers and tax professionals.  However, regulations and standards now restrict the use 
of contingent contract structures for tax services (IRS 2011; AICPA 2011).  The 
experimental results reported herein suggest that, contrary to the claims of regulators and 
lawmakers, the restrictions of contract structure cause suboptimal behavior by tax 
professionals.  Specifically, in the highly uncertain environment in which tax 
professionals operate, regulations that restrict contingent fee contracts between taxpayers 
and tax professionals may backfire – restrictions may actually increase the likelihood of 
aggressive behavior by tax professionals.   
Research has shown that taxpayers view tax professionals’ primary duties as those 
of (1) resolving uncertainty and (2) minimizing the overall cost of tax compliance, 
including tax liabilities and the costs related to tax services (Jackson and Milliron 1986; 
Johnson 1993; Phillips and Sansing 1998).  Christensen (1994) and Stephenson (2006) 
suggest that tax professional’s behavior is based on perceptions of their client’s 
expectations, and that tax professionals most often see their role as minimizing their 
client’s tax liability.  However, prior to the start of an engagement, tax professionals 
cannot always perfectly predict the necessary services to be provided or the benefit that 
will be realized by the taxpayer (AICPA 2006; Kadous and Magro 2001).  In many 
situations, an estimate of the anticipated outcome of the engagement is communicated to 
the client and, in turn, influences the contract with the client (AICPA 2006; Phillips and 




serve as a reference point that the client will use to evaluate the value and quality of the 
services provided by the tax professional at the conclusion of the engagement.   
There are three potential results of providing a taxpayer with an estimate of the 
tangible value of the tax services to be provided: (1) the benefit obtained is exactly equal 
to the estimate provided (no benefit surprise); (2) the benefit obtained exceeds the 
estimate provided (a positive benefit surprise); or (3) the benefit obtained is less than the 
estimate provided (a negative benefit surprise).  If taxpayers use the projected benefit as a 
reference point, a negative benefit surprise may negatively impact their evaluation of the 
tax professional.  A tax professional anticipating this negative client reaction may search 
for ways to increase the benefit realized by the client, including taking uncertain positions 
on the tax return.  I predict that a tax professional encountering a negative benefit surprise 
will be more likely to include uncertain tax positions on the tax return than a tax 
professional encountering a positive benefit surprise.  
The reaction to a benefit surprise is important because it has significant 
implications for how tax professionals behave under different contract structures.  While 
prior research has not identified the estimate provided to the client as a reference point 
for the evaluation of the tax professional, prior research has suggested that taxpayers use 
the difference between the actual outcome and the fee for services in forming their 
judgments (Phillips and Sansing 1998).  When the contract has been structured as a fixed 
fee and there is a negative benefit surprise, the fee for services (1) consumes an 
unexpectedly high fraction of any benefit actually realized and (2) results in a situation 
where the client bears the entire burden of the difference between the actual outcome and 




In contrast, a contingent fee contract structure creates a situation where (1) the 
risk that a negative benefit surprise will impact the client is shared by the tax 
professional, and (2) the economic impact of the negative surprise on the taxpayer is 
dampened by the reduced fee for the services provided.  In this manner, a contingent fee 
contract structure allows the tax professional to share the inherent risk of a negative 
change in the actual, versus estimated, outcome with the taxpayer.  I predict that tax 
professionals’ reactions to the direction of the benefit surprise will interact with contract 
structure such that a tax professional who contracts for a fixed fee and encounters a 
negative benefit surprise will be more likely to include uncertain tax positions on the tax 
return than a professional who contracts for a contingent fee and encounters a negative 
benefit surprise.   
In addition to affecting tax professionals’ propensity to include an aggressive 
position on the tax return, contract structure may also affect the information provided to 
the taxpayer by the tax professional.  Tax professionals who engage in more aggressive 
judgments to meet client expectations may feel pressure to not fully disclose their choices 
to the taxpayer.  Research in psychology has shown that participants will be more likely 
to share negative news when the recipient of the news perceives that both parties will 
share in the fate (Johnson et al. 1974).  Tax professionals contracting under a contingent 
fee structure share in the economic impact of the negative benefit surprise.  This may 
reduce the potential for the tax professional to hide the negative benefit surprise by 
including uncertain tax positions on the tax return and hiding information from the 




structure will be more likely to inform the client that positions taken on the return may 
not be supportable if challenged by the IRS.  
I employ a 2x2 between-subjects experimental design that manipulates contract 
structure (fixed versus contingent) and benefit surprise (positive versus negative).  I 
explore the interactive effect of these two variables on the likelihood that tax 
professionals will include uncertain positions on the client’s tax return and inform the 
client that uncertain positions may not be upheld if challenged.  The experiment presents 
a situation where a tax professional that has encountered a benefit surprise (unknown to 
the taxpayer) must determine whether they will include uncertain positions on the tax 
return.   
Results demonstrate that contract structure interacts with benefit surprise to affect 
tax professionals’ behavior.  Tax professionals who contract under a fixed fee and 
encounter a negative benefit surprise are more likely to include uncertain tax positions 
than tax professionals who contract under a contingent fee structure and encounter a 
negative benefit surprise.  In contrast, tax professionals who contract under a fixed fee 
contract and encounter a positive benefit surprise are less likely to include uncertain tax 
positions than professionals who contract under a contingent fee and encounter a positive 
benefit surprise.  In addition, professionals who contract under a contingent fee are more 
likely to inform their client that a position may not be sustained if challenged by the IRS.   
Supplemental analysis comparing professionals’ judgments of whether a position 
is likely to be upheld by a Tax Court judge to their likelihood of taking that position show 
a similar pattern of results.  Participants contracting under a fixed fee report a higher 




when they encounter a negative (positive) benefit surprise.  Participants who contract 
under a contingent fee show no significant difference between their likelihood of taking a 
position and their judgments of the level of support for that position, regardless of benefit 
surprise.   
This study makes several contributions to the growing literature on tax 
professionals’ judgments and decision-making. Results highlight the importance of 
benefit surprise and the potential for that surprise to interact with contract structure to 
affect professionals’ behavior.  Contrary to regulators’ claims that contingent fees for tax 
services will increase noncompliance, results demonstrate that restricting contingent fee 
contracts actually increases the likelihood of aggressive behavior by tax professionals 
when they encounter a negative benefit surprise.  This increase is especially pronounced 
for categories of cost that are less than 50% likely to be sustained.  These results may 
inform regulators about potential consequences of constraining economic interactions 
between taxpayers and tax professionals.  Careful consideration should be given to the 
potential for contextual factors to negatively impact behavior when contract structures are 
limited.   
In addition, this study is the first to examine whether contract structure affects tax 
professionals’ likelihood of informing taxpayers that tax return positions may not be 
supported if challenged.  This reduction in the amount of information provided to clients 
by the tax professional may leave them unaware of aggressive positions taken on their 
returns and, as a consequence, undermine a fundamental aspect of our income tax system 
– the ability of taxpayers to accurately report their income.  Reduced communication 




prefer conservative tax positions (Hite and McGill 1992) but lack the expertise required 
to identify an aggressive position and have been shown to follow both conservative and 
aggressive recommendations made by tax professionals (Newberry et al. 1993; Beck et 
al. 1996).   
The remaining discussion is organized as follows:  Section II provides a brief 
overview of the contingent fee contract structure debate.  Section III develops the 
hypotheses.  Section IV describes the methodology employed.  Section V describes the 
experimental results. Section VI provides a discussion of the contribution and limitations 










II.  BACKGROUND 
Contingent Fee Contract Structure 
In 1985, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigated the AICPA for 
illegally restricting trade by banning contingent fee contract structures (Mason 1994).2  
As the two parties neared settlement, the FTC wrote a proposed settlement that would 
allow contingent fees for tax services (Phillips and Sansing 1998).  Before a final 
agreement was reached, then-acting IRS Commissioner Murphy argued that “contingent 
fee structure[s] will encourage tax return preparers to take unsupported positions on the 
taxpayer's returns" (Murphy 1989, p. 2).  This argument is consistent with conventional 
wisdom that tax professionals contracting under a contingent fee will include aggressive 
positions on their clients’ returns in order to increase their fees.  In response to 
Commissioner Murphy’s concern, the IRS amended Treasury Circular 230 to prohibit 
contingent fees in many contexts, including the filing of an original tax return (IRS 1994, 
2011).  The final settlement agreement led the AICPA to issue revised ethics rules 
prohibiting contingent fee contracts when the engagement was with clients for whom 
attest services are performed or for the preparation of an original tax return (FTC 1989).   
Despite the intent of the revised Circular 230 to decrease the incentives (and 
increase the risks) associated with aggressive behavior, differences in interpretation of the 
rules limited their effectiveness.  The assumptions that contract structure (1) continued to 
be a driving factor in accountants’ decisions to be more aggressive with their 
                                                
2 See Sager (1993), Mason (1994), and Phillips and Sansing (1998) for a more thorough discussion of the 




recommendations to clients and (2) ultimately affects the positions taken on tax returns 
has kept fee structure at the forefront of the debate related to tax professionals’ behavior 
(Newberry et al. 1993; Phillips and Sansing 1998; Levin 2009).  In addition to the 
correspondence between the AICPA Committee and the IRS, Senator Carl Levin (2009) 
more recently emphasized the need to eliminate contingent fee structures for tax services 
in order to curb the abusive behavior of tax professionals.   
In contrast to the claimed negative influence of contingent fees on tax 
professionals’ behavior, the AICPA’s Tax Practice Responsibilities Committee  asserted 
that there might be benefits to allowing contingent fees (AICPA 2006).  The AICPA 
Committee stated that contingent fees were important to the public’s perception that 
representation is available to all taxpayers who have a legitimate claim against the IRS, 
regardless of ability to pay.3  Further, the AICPA Committee argued that it was in the 
IRS’ best interest to encourage taxpayers to avail themselves of services that would 
resolve potential examination issues before a return was audited.  The AICPA Committee 
also asserted that when tax professionals have the ability to charge a contingent fee, they 
will be more likely to accept only engagements “where the IRS’ position is open to 
challenge” (AICPA 2006, p. 13), thereby increasing the overall incidence of compliance.   
Stressing that fee structure should not be limited by a third party, but should be 
founded on mutual trust and what the two parties (taxpayer and tax professional) agree is 
most fair and will best serve their respective interests, the AICPA Committee argued that 
contingent fee structures best align the interests of the taxpayer and the tax professional.  
The AICPA Committee emphasized “each type of fee arrangement inherently poses 
                                                
3 Restricting the use of a contingent fee essentially limits the ability to retain professional tax assistance to 




financial risks to the practitioner, the taxpayer, or both” (AICPA 2006, p. 13).  These 
risks arise because it is not always possible for practitioners to determine, up front, the 
extent of the services necessary or “the tangible value of such services to the taxpayer” 
(AICPA 2006, p. 13).  While difficult to make, this initial estimate affects the size and 
type of the fee for services and serves as an important risk reduction tool for both parties 
(AICPA 2006).4  
The AICPA Committee’s emphasis on the importance of the tangible value of 
services rendered is consistent with prior tax literature showing that (1) evaluations of tax 
professionals are based primarily on the outcome of the services provided (Jackson and 
Milliron 1986; Newberry et al. 1993; Phillips and Sansing 1998) and (2) tax professionals 
expect to collect a larger percentage of their billable time when the client is in a tax 
refund position (Jackson et al. 2005).  Phillips and Sansing’s (1998) analytical model also 
emphasized the importance of the benefit realized by the taxpayer relative to the amount 
of the fee paid.5  Their model suggests that taxpayers would be required to pay higher 
fees under a fixed (versus contingent) fee structure, which would, in turn, cause taxpayers 
to be more aggressive as they attempted to realize a greater tax benefit to offset the higher 
fee paid.   
 
                                                
4 If the estimated benefit of the services is sufficient, the taxpayer and tax professional will determine the 
appropriate fee for the engagement.  However, if the estimated benefit of the service does not exceed a 
minimal reservation price, the taxpayer will not engage the professional to provide the service.  In addition 
to the costs of receiving the services, taxpayers may also consider participation by client personnel, the 
possibility of audit, and any uncertainty inherent in the estimate. 
5 See Reinganum and Wilde (1991), Cuccia (1994), and Anderson and Cuccia (2000) for applications of 
principal-agent theory to the taxpayer-tax professional relationship.  See also Eisenhardt (1989) for a 
review of agency literature and Baiman (1990) for a review of the use of agency theory in accounting 









III.  HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Benefit Surprise 
Client satisfaction, an important part of tax professionals’ ability to maximize 
utility from their practice (Kadous and Magro 2001), has been shown to be closely linked 
with the outcome of the tax services provided (Phillips and Sansing 1998).  Research 
reports that taxpayers view tax professionals’ primary duties as those of (1) resolving 
uncertainty and (2) minimizing tax liabilities and the costs related to tax services 
(Jackson and Milliron 1986; Johnson 1993; Phillips and Sansing 1998).  Christensen 
(1992) and Stephenson (2006) suggest that a tax professional’s behavior is based on 
perceptions of the client’s expectations.  These expectations may be set by the tax 
professional at the beginning of the engagement.   
During their discussion of factors that impact the structure and amount of the fee 
for tax services, the AICPA Committee highlighted the importance and difficulty of 
estimating the “tangible value” of the services to be provided to the client (AICPA 2006, 
p. 13).  As the engagement concludes, the initial estimate may also serve as a reference 
point for the client’s evaluation of both the success of the engagement and the 
competence of the tax professional (Phillips and Sansing 1998; Newberry et al. 1993).  
However, a tax professional’s inability to precisely determine the tangible benefit to be 




initially communicated to the client and the actual benefit realized from the services (i.e., 
a benefit surprise).6   
This benefit surprise may influence the client’s evaluation of the competence of 
the tax professional and impact their evaluation of the quality and value of the services 
provided (Phillip and Sansing 1998; AICPA 2006).  When the actual benefit realized 
from the services exceeds the reference point established at the beginning of the 
engagement (i.e., a positive benefit surprise) the client will likely be pleased with the 
result and, by extension, with the service provider (Newberry et al. 1993).  However, 
holding all else constant, a realized benefit that falls short of the initially established 
reference point (i.e., a negative benefit surprise) will likely have a negative impact on the 
client’s evaluation of the tax professional and the quality of the services provided, as well 
as their assessment of the value of those services compared to the fee paid (Phillip and 
Sansing 1998; AICPA 2006).   
A desire to meet their client’s expectations may cause tax professionals 
encountering a negative benefit surprise to be more likely to include uncertain tax 
positions on the return in order to deliver a positive result to their client.  Although 
putting a client in a more aggressive position may expose them to the risk of IRS audit, 
tax professionals have been shown to view that risk as negligible, and it may not weigh 
heavily on their decisions (Klepper and Nagin 1989a, 1989b, Cuccia 1994).  In the 
presence of a negative benefit surprise, the risk of disappointing or even losing the client 
                                                
6 There are three potential results of providing a taxpayer with an estimate of the tangible value of the tax 
services to be provided: 1) the benefit obtained is exactly equal to the estimate provided; 2) the benefit 
obtained exceeds the estimate provided (a positive benefit surprise); or 3) the benefit obtained is less than 




may outweigh, or be more salient than, the risk of detection posed by the IRS (Jackson 
and Milliron 1986; Newberry et al. 1993).7  Formally, I hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1:  Tax professionals who encounter a negative benefit surprise will 
be more likely to take uncertain tax positions than tax professionals who 




The effect of a negative or positive benefit surprise may be exacerbated by the 
structure of the contract between the taxpayer and tax professional.  If there is a negative 
benefit surprise and the contract has been structured as a fixed fee contract, the fee for 
services (1) consumes a larger portion of the benefit realized and (2) results in a situation 
where the client bears the entire economic burden of the difference between the actual 
outcome and the estimate originally provided.  Phillips and Sansing’s (1998) model of 
taxpayer behavior suggests that taxpayers compare the dollar outcome of the services 
provided with the amount of the fee charged for those services.  Extending that same 
comparison to a negative benefit surprise would suggest that taxpayers will be averse to 
negative changes in the benefit of the services provided relative to the fee charged for 
those services.  Therefore, a tax professional that encounters a negative benefit surprise 
and is providing services under a fixed fee contract may have heightened expectations 
that the client will be dissatisfied.  This may cause the tax professional to be even more 
likely to include uncertain tax positions on the tax return in order to increase the chances 
that the client is pleased.  
                                                
7 While it appears that a tax professional would benefit from always underestimating the value of the 
services to be provided so as to exceed the client’s expectations, often referred to as “underpromise and 
overdeliver” (Trautz and Pinnington 2009, p. 12), that is not always feasible.  Underestimating may cause 
the client not to engage the professional in favor of someone else, or to forgo the services altogether.  In 
addition, repeatedly overdelivering may shift the reference point, such that the client begins to expect that 




In contrast to a fixed fee contract structure, outcome uncertainty is implicit in a 
contingent fee contract structure.8  A contingent fee contract structure creates a situation 
where (1) there is no change in the relative portion of the benefit consumed by the 
ultimate fee charged and (2) the economic impact of the negative surprise on the taxpayer 
is lessened by the reduced fee for the services provided.  This is consistent with the 
argument of the AICPA Committee (2006) that a contingent fee structure would better 
align the interests of the contracting parties.   While a fixed fee contract may exacerbate 
the likelihood of losing the client if a negative benefit surprise is encountered, a 
contingent fee contract structure allows the tax professional to share the economic risk of 
a negative change in the actual, versus estimated, outcome with the taxpayer and may 
reduce the likelihood of losing the client.  Such a reduction in the risk of losing the client 
may also reduce the propensity for a tax professional contracting under a contingent fee 
and encountering a negative benefit surprise to take uncertain tax positions.  
While a contingent fee may reduce the pressure to include uncertain positions 
when a negative benefit surprise is encountered, the same may not hold true when a 
positive benefit surprise is encountered.  Hypothesis 1 suggests that, when a tax 
professional encounters a negative benefit surprise, the possibility of disappointing or 
even losing the client may outweigh the additional risk of an IRS audit, leading tax 
professionals to take aggressive positions on returns.  However, when a positive benefit 
surprise is encountered, the likelihood of disappointing or losing the client and the 
associated reputation concerns are greatly reduced.  Rather than focusing on the salience 
of losing the client, the tax professional evaluating potentially aggressive decisions would 
                                                
8 If the benefit could be precisely estimated, there would be no need to contract under a contingent fee 
arrangement.  Rather, a taxpayer who could not pay up front could pay a fixed amount after the known 




now be making a judgment based on the riskiness of the tax position relative to the 
potential gain of taking the aggressive position.  Under a contingent fee contract 
structure, the incremental tax benefit of taking the aggressive position would be directly 
rewarded with an increase in the fee received by the tax professional.  This may 
encourage the tax professional to be more aggressive in their recommendations to 
taxpayers, as suggested by the IRS (Murphy 1989).  This incremental benefit would not 
be available when contracting under a fixed fee contract.  Therefore, a tax professional 
contracting under a fixed fee may not be motivated to take uncertain positions.  I predict 
that:  
Hypothesis 2a: When a negative benefit surprise is encountered, tax 
professionals contracting under a fixed fee will be more likely to take uncertain 
tax positions than professionals contracting under a contingent fee. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: When a positive benefit surprise is encountered, tax professionals 
contracting under a fixed fee will be less likely to take uncertain tax positions than 
professionals contracting under a contingent fee structure. 
 
Note that Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict an interaction between contract structure 
and benefit surprise. The form of that interaction is shown in Figure 1.   
In addition to reducing the pressure to avoid a negative benefit surprise, the direct 
alignment of the taxpayer and tax professional’s financial interest, found in the context of 
contingent fees, may affect the communication between the taxpayer and tax 
professional.  Hypotheses 1 and 2a suggest that tax professionals encountering a negative 
benefit surprise may take aggressive positions on the tax return to increase the benefit to 













preference for taking conservative positions on their returns, and have even reported a 
desire to disengage the professional when provided with advice they identify as overly 
aggressive (Hite and McGill 1992; Stephenson 2006).  At the same time, taxpayers lack 
the expertise required to identify an aggressive position and have been shown to follow 
both conservative and aggressive recommendations made by tax professionals (Newberry 
et al. 1993; Beck et al. 1996).  Therefore, while a tax professional may be motivated by 
contextual factors to take aggressive tax positions, informing the client that positions may 
not be supported could ultimately result in losing the client.  
However, a contingent fee contract structure may reduce the risk that informing 
the client about uncertain positions will result in losing the client.  Research in 
Contingent Fee Fixed Fee 
Negative Benefit Surprise 




psychology has shown that individuals are more likely to share negative news when the 
recipient of the news perceives that both parties will share in the fate (Johnson et al. 
1974).  Tax professionals contracting under a contingent fee structure share in the 
economic impact of the tax position, including uncertain positions taken on the return.  
This alignment of interests may result in increased trust between the taxpayer and the tax 
professional (AICPA 2006; Dana and Spier 1993) and reduce the pressure on the tax 
professional to hide the impact of a benefit surprise (Johnson et al. 1974).  Thus, 
professionals contracting under a contingent fee contract structure may be more likely 
than professionals contracting under a fixed fee contract structure to inform the taxpayer 
that uncertain positions on the tax return may not be sustained if challenged.  I 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3:  Tax professionals contracting under a contingent (fixed) fee will 
be more (less) likely to inform the taxpayer that an uncertain tax position may not 











IV.  METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
 A 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental design was used to examine how fee 
structure (contingent versus fixed) and benefit surprise (positive versus negative) affect 
tax professionals’ recommendations to clients.  After reading introductory information, 
48 practicing tax professionals with R&D tax credit experience were asked to determine 
the likelihood that a tax professional would include uncertain positions in the calculation 
of a client’s R&D tax credit.  Participants then responded to supplemental, demographic, 
and manipulation check questions.   
Participants 
 All participants were experienced tax professionals from large, international firms 
who specialized in providing R&D tax credit services to clients.  I solicited participation 
through firm representatives and direct contact with tax professionals.  Participants were 
emailed an invitation to participate in the study.  The email contained a link to the online 
instrument administered via Qualtrics.  Ultimately, 48 practicing tax professionals with 
R&D tax credit experience participated in the study.  Participants had a mean (median) 
age of 32 (31), and 8.6 (7.7) years of professional tax experience.   
Participants also self-reported their familiarity with the R&D tax credit by 
responding to the question, “How familiar are you with the research and development 
(R&D) tax credit?”  Responses were on a scale from 0-100 anchored by “NOT very 




was 82.0 (91.1).  None of the demographic variables differed by condition and they do 
not significantly affect the dependent variables.  Information about participants is 
included Table 1.  
Task  
 Participants were presented with background information related to a hypothetical 
tax professional and taxpayer.  The tax professional is described as a high performer in 
their firm, who has exceeded his billing, realization, and client development goals.  The 
tax professional is also told that his team has been assigned the R&D tax credit 
engagement for a new client due to his tax expertise and the quality of his client 
relationships.  This detailed information about the tax professional is provided in order to 
establish that the tax professional is reasonably competent and reduce the likelihood that 
participants attribute the benefit surprise to a lack of competence on the part of the tax 
professional.  
 The client is introduced as an S corporation in the biotechnology industry that is 
just beginning to invest significant funds in activities that potentially qualify for the R&D 
tax credit.  The client is described as not having any employees with the expertise 
necessary to calculate the R&D tax credit or capable of scrutinizing the work of a tax 
professional who calculates the R&D credit on their behalf.  This information is provided 
so that participants have the mental freedom to include positions without concerns that 
the client will second-guess their decisions.  All participants are told that, prior to 
engaging the professional to provide the services, the tax professional estimated that the 
client’s R&D tax credit would be “about $200,000.”  After providing that estimate to the 
















Age 32.0 9.8 26.0 31.0 35.0 
Years of tax experience 8.6 7.7 3.5 7.0 10.0 
Familiarity with R&D Tax Credit  82.0 20.3 66.9 91.1 100.0 
Participants consist of 48 tax professionals with R&D tax credit experience who responded 
to an email request to participate in an online experiment.  Two-thirds of the participants 






Contract Structure Manipulation 
 The manipulation of contract structure (“CONTRACT”) is communicated as 
follows.  In the fixed fee contract setting, participants are told that “the fee for the 
engagement is structured as a fixed fee of $70,000.”  In the contingent fee contract 
setting, participants are told that “the fee for the engagement is structured as a contingent 
fee of 35% of the final R&D tax credit.”   
Benefit Surprise Manipulation 
 Benefit surprise (“SURPRISE”) was manipulated by telling participants that, 
when reviewing the R&D tax credit calculation, the tax professional found new 
information that changed the current calculated credit.  Participants in the positive 
(negative) benefit surprise condition were told that incorporating that information, 
“results in an increase (a decrease) in the final R&D tax credit of $90,000, making the 
calculated R&D tax credit $290,000 ($110,000), rather than the originally estimated 
$200,000 communicated to [the client] prior to the engagement.”  
Uncertain Tax Position(s) 
 Participants next learn that the engagement team has identified a potentially 
qualifying project that has not been incorporated into the current calculation of the R&D 
tax credit amount and that client’s management team has not identified it as a potentially 
qualifying activity.  Participants learned that the costs associated with the project are 
broken into three categories, and that the support for including each category in the 
calculation of the R&D tax credit varies.  Participants are not provided with the level of 
support for the three categories of costs.  Rather, the potentially qualifying activities for 




that including all of the costs in the calculation of the credit would increase the current 
credit by $100,000.  They are informed that this increase would bring the total credit 
amount to $390,000 ($210,000) in the positive (negative) benefit surprise condition.9   
 The three categories of costs were developed with an R&D manager and partner 
at one of the Big 4 firms providing participants.  The descriptions were calibrated such 
that the costs described in Category 1 were 55% likely to be upheld by a Tax Court judge, 
the costs described in Category 2 were 35% likely to be upheld by a Tax Court judge, and 
the costs described in Category 3 were 0-5% likely to be upheld by a Tax Court judge.10  
Including a position with virtually no support provide the opportunity to directly explore 
the IRS’s claim that contingent fees will result in professionals taking unsupportable 
positions.11  In addition, differing levels of support provides the opportunity to explore 
whether the effects of the independent variables on professionals’ behavior differs based 
on the level of support for a position.  
Dependent Measures 
The dependent variables for Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b are tax professionals’ 
assessment of the likelihood that the tax professional “will choose to include the costs 
related to [each category described] in the final calculation of the R&D tax credit?”  For 
each category of costs, participants responded on a scale from 0-100, with anchoring 
descriptions of “Definitely WILL NOT Include” and “Definitely WILL Include.”  The 
                                                
9 The descriptions of each category also includes the amount that the credit will increase if that category is 
added.  The three categories of cost increase the credit by $32,000, $35,000, and $33,000, respectively.  
 
10 The descriptions were then provided to three other R&D professionals at the Senior Manager/Partner 
level to confirm the likelihood ratings.  See supplemental testing below for an analysis of participants’ 
reported likelihood judgments.  
 
11 Although the IRS has not provided percentage thresholds for most positions, Fleming and Whittenburg 





dependent variables for Hypothesis 3 are the reported likelihoods that the tax professional 
will inform the client that each category of cost may not be upheld if challenged by the 
IRS.  To aid in interpreting their response to that measure, I simultaneously ask 
participants whether they feel the tax professional has a responsibility to inform the client 
that each category of costs may not be upheld under audit. 
Supplemental Measures 
 In addition to responding to the dependent measures, participants responded to 
supplemental judgment measures and follow-up questions.  Participants were asked to 
select the final number that would be reported to the client.  This question allowed them 
to make a selection that did not include any of the uncertain categories of cost, included 
only the first category, included both the first and second categories of cost, etc.  
Participants then responded to process measures related to possible motivations for the 
tax professional’s decision to include or exclude amounts in the credit.  Next, participants 
rated the likelihood that a Tax Court judge will uphold each of the three cost categories if 
the R&D tax credit were selected for audit.  Finally, participants responded to 
manipulation checks and demographic questions.   
V.  RESULTS 
Tests of Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that tax professionals experiencing a negative benefit 
surprise would be more likely to include uncertain costs in the final R&D tax credit 
calculation than tax professionals experiencing a positive benefit surprise.  The dependent 
measures used to test Hypothesis 1 are respondents’ ratings of the likelihood that the tax 




costs in the final calculation of the R&D tax credit.  Hypothesis 1 is supported if 
participants are more likely to include the uncertain costs described in the three 
categories when they encounter a negative benefit surprise than when they encounter a 
positive benefit surprise.12 
Panel A of Table 2 provides the means for Category 1 for each of the four 
experimental conditions and Panel B provides the analysis of variance (ANOVA). A 
comparison of the row means shows that participants in the negative benefit surprise 
condition report a mean likelihood of including Category 1 in the final R&D tax credit 
calculation of 69.50, compared to a mean of 52.00 for participants in the positive benefit 
surprise condition.  This pattern of means is in the hypothesized direction, and an 
examination of the ANOVA for Category 1 shows that SURPRISE has a significant 
effect on participants’ likelihood ratings (p-value = 0.012).  For Category 1, the 
hypothesized effect of negative benefit surprise on tax professionals’ likelihood of 
including uncertain positions is supported.  
Table 3 provides the ANOVA results and means for the costs described in 
Category 2. Panel A shows that participants in the negative benefit surprise condition 
report a mean likelihood of including the position of 46.16, compared to a mean of 26.25 
for participants in the positive benefit surprise condition.  These results are also in the 
hypothesized direction.  The ANOVA for Category 2 shows that SURPRISE has a 
significant effect on participants’ likelihood ratings (p-value = 0.010), providing 
additional support for H1.  
                                                
12 In addition to the tests I describe in this section, I also performed a MANOVA for all three categories.  
The MANOVA shows that the main effect of SURPRISE is significant (p-value = 0.014) and the 





Table 2 – Analyses for Category 1 
 
Panel A: Mean Likelihood of Including the Uncertain Costs from Category 1 
  
 Contract Structure    
Benefit 
Surprise Contingent Fee   Fixed Fee   Row Means  
Negative Mean =  62.98  Mean =  77.99  Mean =  69.50  
 Std. dev. = 26.59  Std. dev. = 12.46  Std. dev. = 22.52  
 n =  13  n = 10  n = 23  
          
Positive Mean =  61.57  Mean =  41.63  Mean =  52.00  
 Std. dev. = 24.69  Std. dev. = 38.41  Std. dev. = 32.93  
 n = 13  n = 12  n = 25  
          
     Column Mean = 62.27  Mean = 58.16  Mean =  60.39  
     Means Std. dev. = 25.15  Std. dev. = 34.39  Std. dev. = 29.48  
 n = 26  n =  22  n = 48  
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results 
 
    
 
Likelihood of Including Category 1 
  
        df MS   F-statistic   p-value 
SURPRISE   1 4229.64  5.568 0.012 * 
CONTRACT   1 71.87  0.095 0.760  
SURPRISE * CONTRACT  1 3622.49  4.769 0.017 * 
Error    44 759.58     
Total    48      
 




Planned Contrast     t-statistic   df   p-value  
Interaction effect of SURPRISE and 
CONTRACT  
2.86  44 0.004 * 












Table 3 – Analyses for Category 2 
 
Panel A: Mean Likelihood of Including the Uncertain Costs from Category 2 
  
 Contract Structure    
Benefit 
Surprise Contingent Fee   Fixed Fee   Row Means  
Negative Mean =  35.17  Mean =  60.45  Mean =  46.16  
 Std. dev. = 35.14  Std. dev. = 28.17  Std. dev. = 34.09  
 n =  13  n = 10  n = 23  
          
Positive Mean =  29.90  Mean =  22.30  Mean =  26.25  
 Std. dev. = 30.64  Std. dev. = 29.04  Std. dev. = 29.52  
 n = 13  n = 12  n = 25  
          
     Column Mean = 38.45  Mean = 39.64  Mean =  35.79  
     Means Std. dev. = 32.42  Std. dev. = 34.06  Std. dev. = 33.02  
 n = 26  n =  22  n = 48  
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results 
    
 
 
Likelihood of Including Category 2 
  
        df MS   F-statistic   p-value 
SURPRISE   1 5593.16  5.79 0.010 * 
CONTRACT   1 926.33  0.96 0.333  
SURPRISE * CONTRACT  1 3204.94  4.76 0.038 * 
Error    44 966.14     
Total    48      
 




Planned Contrast     t-statistic   df   p-value  
Interaction effect of SURPRISE and 
CONTRACT  
2.79  44 0.004 * 









While the conditions for an ANOVA are met for Categories 1 and 2, they are not 
met for Category 3.  Specifically, tests for homogeneity of variance and skewness show 
that, for Category 3, the between-cell variances are significantly different (p-value < 
0.05) and the underlying data is positively skewed (skewness-statistic = 4.295).  Quinn 
and Keough (2002) note that, while PROC GLM may be robust to violations of 
homogeneity of variance, it may not be robust when the distribution is positively skewed.  
In such circumstances, rank transformations of the response variable may be appropriate.  
Therefore, I perform a rank-transformed (RT) ANOVA for Category 3.  Table 4 reports 
results for Category 3.  Panel A shows that the row mean for participants in the negative 
benefit surprise conditions were 7.12, compared to the row mean of 3.87 for participants 
in the negative benefit surprise conditions.13  In Panel B, results for the RT ANOVA 
show a significant effect of SURPRISE (p-value = 0.062).   
Overall, these results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1.  Participants 
encountering a negative benefit surprise were more likely to take the uncertain tax 
positions than participants experiencing a positive benefit surprise.  This suggests that, in 
addition to playing an important role when contracting for services (AICPA 2006), the 
initial estimate is also an important factor in tax professionals’ judgments and 
recommendations to clients.   
Tests of Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict an interaction between CONTRACT and 
SURPRISE.  Hypothesis 2a is supported if participants who contract under a fixed fee 
contract structure and encounter a negative benefit surprise are more likely to include  
                                                
13 Participants were ranked from 1 (least aggressive) to 48 (most aggressive).  The mean ranking for 




Table 4 – Analyses for Category 3 
 
Panel A: Mean Likelihood of Including the Uncertain Costs from Category 3 
  
 Contract Structure    
Benefit 
Surprise Contingent Fee   Fixed Fee   Row Means  
Negative Mean =  2.72  Mean =  12.85  Mean =  7.12  
 Std. dev. = 5.77  Std. dev. = 25.44  Std. dev. = 17.59  
 n =  13  n = 10  n = 23  
          
Positive Mean =  5.80  Mean =  1.78  Mean =  3.87  
 Std. dev. = 10.5
7 
 Std. dev. = 3.51  Std. dev. = 8.10 
 
 n = 13  n = 12  n = 25  
          
     Column Mean = 4.26  Mean = 5.77  Mean =  3.87  
     Means Std. dev. = 8.49  Std. dev. = 17.77  Std. dev. = 13.45  
 n = 26  n =  22  n = 48  
 
Panel B: Rank-Transformed ANOVA Results 
 
    
 
Likelihood of Including Category 3  
        df MS   F-statistic   p-value 
SURPRISE   1 763.38  2.34 0.066 * 
CONTRACT   1 335.33  1.03 0.316  
SURPRISE * CONTRACT  1 1692.63  5.19 0.014 * 
Error    44 325.99     
Total    48      
 




Planned Contrast     t-statistic   df   p-value  
Interaction effect of SURPRISE and 
CONTRACT  
2.12  44 0.020 * 
* One-
tailed  








uncertain costs in the final research credit than tax participants who contract under a 
contingent fee contract structure and encounter a negative benefit surprise.  Hypothesis 
H2b is supported if participants who contract under a fixed fee structure and encounter a 
positive benefit surprise are less likely to include uncertain costs in the final research 
credit than tax participants who contract under a contingent fee structure and encounter a 
positive benefit surprise (refer to Figure 1 for a visual representation of the hypothesized 
interaction).   
A visual examination of the means for each category of uncertain costs shows 
results consistent with the hypothesized interaction.  Figures 2-4 graph the mean 
likelihood of including the uncertain costs for each category.  For each category of cost, 
participants who contract under a fixed fee structure and encounter a negative benefit 
surprise are more likely to include uncertain costs in the final research credit than tax 
participants who contract under a contingent fee and encounter a negative benefit 
surprise.  In addition, participants who contract under a fixed fee structure and experience 
a positive benefit surprise are less likely to include uncertain costs in the final research 
credit than tax participants who contract under a contingent fee structure and encounter a 
positive benefit surprise.   
The interaction between CONTRACT and SURPRISE is significant for Category 1 (p-
value = 0.017), Category 2 (p-value = 0.038), and Category 3 (p-value = 0.014).  These 
results provide strong support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  I also use planned contrast tests 
to determine whether the pattern of the predicted interaction between CONTRACT and 
SURPRISE is significant.  I use a contrast code of 1, 2, -1, -2 for the contingent 




benefit surprise, and fixed fee/positive benefit surprise, respectively for each category of 
costs (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990).  Panel C of Tables 2, 3, and 4 shows the results 
of this test of the predicted pattern of cell means for Categories 1, 2, and 3.  The contrast 
is significant for all categories of uncertain costs.  For Category 1, Table 2 reports a t-
statistic of 2.885, one-tailed p-value = 0.004.  For Category 2, Table 3 reports a t-statistic 
of 2.786, one-tailed p-value = 0.004.  For Category 3, Table 4 reports a t-statistic of 
2.117, one-tailed p-value = 0.020.   
These results provide robust support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  Tax professionals 
are more likely to include uncertain positions in tax returns when they are contracting 
under a fixed fee and encounter a negative benefit surprise than when they are contracting 
under a contingent fee and encounter a negative benefit surprise.  In contrast, when 
professionals contract under a fixed fee and encounter a positive benefit surprise, they are 
less likely to include uncertain positions in tax returns than when they contract under a 
contingent fee contract structure.  
Test of Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 predicts a main effect of CONTRACT.  H3 is supported if 
professionals contracting under a contingent fee structure are more likely to inform the 
client that a category of cost may not be upheld if challenged by the IRS.  In analyzing 
participants’ responses to the dependent measure for H3, I control for their responses to 
the question asking whether they feel the tax professional has a responsibility to inform 
the client about the position.  Figure 5 displays participants’ means responses.  Table 5 
displays the results of the ANCOVAs.  For Categories 1 and 2, participants assessments 
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Panel B: Rank of Likelihood of Including the Costs from Category 3* 
 
 
*Participants are ranked from 1 to 48, with a rank of 1 being assigned to the participant who is least likely 
to include the costs from Category 3 and 48 being assigned to the participant who is most likely to include 
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Figure 5 – Likelihood of Informing Client  
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Table 5 – Communication 
 
Panel A: Mean Likelihood of Informing Client - Category 1 
  
 Contract Structure    
Benefit 
Surprise Contingent Fee   Fixed Fee   Row Means  
Negative Mean =  68.00  Mean =  47.89  Mean =  59.38  
 Std. dev. = 30.12  Std. dev. = 30.88  Std. dev. = 31.38  
 n =  12  n = 9  n = 21 
  
Positive Mean =  71.46  Mean =  62.64  Mean =  67.42  
 Std. dev. = 34.07  Std. dev. = 33.17  Std. dev. = 33.23  
 n = 13  n = 11  n = 24 
  
     Column Mean = 69.80  Mean = 56.00  Mean =  63.67  
     Means Std. dev. = 31.61  Std. dev. = 32.21  Std. dev. = 32.27  
 n = 25  n =  20  n = 45 
  
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results – Category 1 
 
    
 
        df MS   F-statistic   p-value 
RESPONSIBILITY   1 22984.30  47.01 <0.001  
SURPRISE   1 68.31  0.14 0.711  
CONTRACT   1 873.99  1.788 0.095 * 






Table 5 – Communication, Continued 
 
Panel C: Mean Likelihood of Informing Client - Category 2 
  
 Contract Structure    
Benefit 
Surprise Contingent Fee   Fixed Fee   Row Means  
Negative Mean =  77.58  Mean =  61.33  Mean =  70.62  
 Std. dev. = 25.93  Std. dev. = 29.94  Std. dev. = 28.22  
 n =  12  n = 9  n = 21 
  
Positive Mean =  87.00  Mean =  80.73  Mean =  84.13  
 Std. dev. = 19.84  Std. dev. = 19.65  Std. dev. = 19.58  
 n = 13  n = 11  n = 24 
  
     
Column 
Mean = 82.48  Mean = 72.00  Mean =  77.82 
 
     Means Std. dev. = 22.98  Std. dev. = 26.05  Std. dev. = 24.67  
 n = 25  n =  20  n = 45 
  
Panel D: ANOVA Results – Category 2 
 
    
 
        df MS   F-statistic 
  p-
value  
RESPONSIBILITY   1 4525.10  9.72 0.003  
SURPRISE   1 1117.69  2.40 0.129  
CONTRACT   1 1531.97  3.30 0.038 * 























Table 5 – Communication, Continued 
 
Panel E: Mean Likelihood of Informing Client - Category 3 
 Contract Structure   
Benefit 
Surprise Contingent Fee   Fixed Fee   Row Means 
Negative Mean =  84.62  Mean =  93.56  Mean =  88.27 
 Std. dev. = 27.08  Std. dev. = 9.79  Std. dev. = 21.81 
 n =  13  n = 9  n = 22 
 
Positive Mean =  94.31  Mean =  87.50  Mean =  91.04 
 Std. dev. = 13.73  Std. dev. = 18.76  Std. dev. = 16.36 
 n = 13  n = 12  n = 25 
 
     
Column 
Mean = 89.46  Mean = 90.10  Mean =  89.74 
     Means Std. dev. = 21.60  Std. dev. = 15.53  Std. dev. = 18.94 
 n = 26  n =  21  n = 47 
 
Panel F: ANOVA Results – Category 3 
 
    
 
        df MS   F-statistic   p-value 
RESPONSIBILITY   1 172.23  0.46 0.499  
SURPRISE   1 16.12  0.044 0.836  
CONTRACT   1 0.75  0.002 0.482 * 















and 0.003, respectively).  For Categories 1 and 2, participants contracting under a 
contingent fee structure are more likely to inform the client that uncertain positions may 
not be upheld if challenged than participants contracting under a fixed fee.  The mean 
likelihood of informing the client when contracting under a contingent (versus fixed) 
contract structure was 69.80 (versus 56.00) for Category 1 and 82.48 (versus 72.00) for 
Category 2.  An examination of the ANCOVAS for Category 1 and 2 show that these 
differences are significant, with p-values of 0.095 and 0.038, respectively.   
For Category 3, however, there was virtually no difference between levels of 
CONTRACT.  The mean likelihood of informing the client when contracting under a 
contingent (versus fixed) contract structure was 89.46 (versus 90.10) for Category 3 – 
indicating that participants in all conditions were highly likely to inform the client that 
the uncertain position may not be upheld if challenged.  Overall, these results provide 
some support for Hypothesis 3.  Controlling for participants’ perceptions of responsibility 
to inform the client, participants contracting under a contingent fee structure were more 
likely to inform the client that a position may not be supported if challenged.   
Supplemental Analyses 
Judgments of Support 
In addition to the main analysis of the dependent variables for H1, H2a, and H2b 
described above, I further explore the effect of CONTRACT and SURPRISE on tax 
professionals’ behavior by examining participants’ answers to supplemental questions.  
Participants were asked to rate the likelihood that “a Tax Court judge would allow the 
treatment of each category of costs as qualifying research expenses.”  For each category 




“Definitely WOULD NOT Allow” and “Definitely WOULD Allow.”  The three 
categories of cost were intended to describe costs that were 55% (Category 1), 35% 
(Category 2), and 0-5% (Category 3) likely to be upheld if challenged by a Tax Court 
judge.  I first examine the overall mean likelihood assessments for each category of cost.  
The mean likelihood rating was 56.33% for Category 1, 33.41% for Category 2, and 
7.81% for Category 3.  None of the categories had an overall mean that differed 
significantly from the intended calibrations.  ANOVAs for participants’ judgments for 
each category of variables show that there were not significant differences between 
conditions (all p-values for the corrected models ≥ 0.619).   
I next examine how participants’ likelihood of including each category of costs 
differs from their assessments of support.  For each category of cost, I subtract 
participants’ assessments of support from their response to the dependent variable.  For 
example, assume that a participant rates the likelihood that the position would be 
included in the credit to be 55% and their assessment of support is 45%.  The difference 
between these two responses is positive 10.  Thus, a positive difference means that the 
participants’ likelihood of including the position is higher than their assessment of 
support for that position.  Figure 6 displays the differences for the experimental 
conditions.   
For Categories 1, 2, and 3, participants who contract under a fixed fee and 
encounter a negative benefit surprise have an average positive difference of 19.39, 18.75, 
and 4.25, respectively.  These differences are significantly different from zero for 
Categories 1 and 2 (results not tabulated).  Participants who contract under a fixed fee 




Figure 6 – Difference Between Judgments of Support and Likelihood of Including 
Position 
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1.55 for the three categories.  These differences are only significant for Category 1 
(results not tabulated).  None of the mean differences were significant for participants 
contracting under contingent fee structures.  
Final Amount of the R&D Tax Credit 
 
After participants rate the likelihood of including each of the categories of 
uncertain cost in the tax return, they select the final R&D tax credit amount to report to 
the client (FINAL).  This choice task required participants to make one selection that 
included the appropriate categories of cost.  For ease of exposition, Table 6 reports 
participants’ selections in the following manner.  If participants selected a final amount 
that included none of the uncertain positions, their response is coded as zero.  Otherwise 
it was coded a 1, 2, or 3 depending on how many categories of cost they included in their 
final amount.14   
Figure 7 shows the mean responses for the four experimental conditions.  An examination 
of the means shows that the results are consistent with the hypothesized interaction 
between CONTRACT and SURPRISE.  Participants who contract under a fixed fee and 
encounter a negative benefit surprise reported a final amount to the client that included an 
average of 1.80 uncertain positions, compared to 1.31 uncertain positions for 
professionals who contract under a contingent fee and encounter a negative benefit 
surprise.15  In addition, participants who contract under a fixed fee and encounter a 
                                                
14 The experimental question allowed participants to select different combinations of the three categories.  
For instance, participants could have selected categories 1 and 3, rather than 1 and 2.  These responses are 
coded equally as a 2 in the current analysis.  Alternatively I analyze these responses by ranking each choice 
in order of increasing aggression.  Thus, because Category 3 is more aggressive than Category 2, a 
participant who selected the combination of Category 1 and Category 3 would have selected a more 
aggressive combination than a participant who selected a combination of Category 1 and Category 2.  
Analyzing the results with the more descriptive rankings strengthens the results of the ANOVA, but does 





positive benefit surprise reported a final amount to the client that included an average of 
0.75 uncertain positions, compared to 1.31 uncertain positions for professionals who 
contracted under a contingent fee and encounter a positive benefit surprise.  ANOVA 
results in Table 6, Panel B show that the hypothesized main effect of SURPRISE is 
significant (one-tailed p-value = 0.009).  In addition, the hypothesized interaction and 
planned contrasts are also significant (one-tailed p-value = 0.009 and 0.002, 
respectively).  These results provide further support for Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b.  
An examination of the overall results from this experiment provides additional 
insight into the behavior of tax professionals.  Participants who contract under a fixed fee 
contract structure and encounter a negative benefit surprise are significantly more likely 
than participants in all other conditions to include uncertain positions on returns.  
Significantly, 80% of participants contracting under a fixed fee and encountering a 
negative benefit surprise included Category 2 in the final R&D tax credit, even though 
this position was rated as having less than a 40% probability of being upheld if 
challenged (compared to less than 50% of the participants contracting under a contingent 
fee).  While this behavior may be readily identifiable as suboptimal from the perspective 
of the IRS, aggressive behavior may not be the only form of suboptimal behavior.   
Results also show that participants who contract under a fixed fee contract 
structure and encounter a positive benefit surprise are significantly less likely than 
participants in all other conditions to include Category 1 for which the overall mean level 
of support was judged to be greater than 50%.  Examination of the data shows that 40% 
of the participants in that condition did not include any of the uncertain categories of cost 
                                                                                                                                            
15 Only one participant chose to include all three categories of costs in the final R&D tax credit.  That 
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Table 6 – Final Number of Uncertain Positions Reported to Client 
 
Panel A: Mean Final Number of Uncertain Positions Reported to Client 
  
 Contract Structure    
Benefit 
Surprise Contingent Fee   Fixed Fee   Row Means  
Negative Mean =  1.31  Mean =  1.80  Mean =  1.52  
 Std. dev. = 0.75  Std. dev. = 0.63  Std. dev. = 0.73  
 n =  13  n = 10  n = 23  
          
Positive Mean =  1.31  Mean =  0.75  Mean =  1.04  
 Std. dev. = 0.75  Std. dev. = 0.75  Std. dev. = 0.79  
 n = 13  n = 12  n = 25  
          
     Column Mean = 1.31  Mean = 1.23  Mean =  1.27  
     Means Std. dev. = 0.74  Std. dev. = 1.13  Std. dev. = 0.79  
 n = 26  n =  22  n = 48  
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results 
 
    
 
Final Number of Uncertain Positions Reported to Client  
        df MS   F-statistic   p-value  
SURPRISE   1 3.27  6.15 0.009 * 
CONTRACT   1 0.01  0.02 0.878  
SURPRISE * CONTRACT  1 3.27  6.15 0.009 * 
Error    44 0.53     
Total    48      
 




Planned Contrast     t-statistic   df   p-value  
Interaction effect of SURPRISE and 
CONTRACT  
3.058  44 0.002 * 








in the final credit.  This suggests that there may be circumstances where tax professionals 











VI.  CONCLUSION 
This study makes several contributions to the growing literature on tax 
professionals’ judgments and decision-making. This is the first study to empirically 
examine the effect of contract structure and benefit surprise on tax professionals’ 
behavior.  Contrary to claims made by regulators, results show that contingent fees do not 
lead professionals to take unsupportable positions on returns.  Rather, results demonstrate 
that restricting contingent fee contracts actually increases the likelihood of aggressive 
behavior by tax professionals when they encounter a negative benefit surprise.  This 
increase is especially pronounced for categories of cost that are less than 50% likely to be 
sustained. 
This study is also the first to examine whether contract structure affects tax 
professionals’ likelihood of informing taxpayers that tax return positions may not be 
supported if challenged.  Reducing the amount of information provided to clients by the 
tax professional may leave them unaware of aggressive positions taken on their returns 
and, consequently, undermine a fundamental aspect of our income tax system – the 
ability of taxpayers to accurately report their income.  Reduced communication between 
professionals and their clients may be especially significant given that taxpayers prefer 
conservative tax positions (Hite and McGill 1992) but lack the expertise required to 




aggressive recommendations made by tax professionals (Newberry et al. 1993; Beck et 
al. 1996).   
Interpretation of the results of this study are subject to limitations common to 
experiments.  While the experiment discussed herein contained important contextual 
factors, other factors may also affect tax professionals’ behavior.  In addition, 
experimental participants are experienced tax professionals who have expertise in 
delivering R&D tax credit studies to clients.  Professionals in other settings may not react 
to the manipulated variables in the same manner.  Finally, while experimental results 
suggest that participants are highly likely to inform clients that uncertain positions may 
not be supported if challenged, that likelihood was measured with a simultaneous 
measure of perceived responsibility.  It is possible that, absent the measure of perceived 
responsibility, tax professionals would have reported a lower likelihood of informing the 
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